

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 BEIRUT 3264

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS MPOL LE US
SUBJ: REBUILDING THE LEBANESE ARMY: U.S. ASSISTANCE

REF: STATE 155131

1. SUMMARY. WE CANNOT SPEAK WITH CERTAINTY OF FUTURE OF LEBANON, AND ANY U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM CARRIES SOME RISKS. HOWEVER, RISKS OF U.S. INACTION ARE EVEN GREATER. U.S. HAS ALMOST UNIQUE CAPABILITY TO ASSIST IN REBUILDING LEBANESE ARMY. LEBANESE EXPECTATIONS ARE NOT EXAGGERATED. CREATION OF LEBANESE ARMY WILL REDUCE LIKELIHOOD OF SYRIAN HEGEMONY. WE BELIEVE VIETNAM ANALOGY IS NOT APPROPRIATE, AND LEBANESE ARE FULLY AWARE OF IMPORTANCE OF RELYING ON THEMSELVES. VISIBILITY OF A U.S. PROGRAM NOT A BAD THING. LEBANESE FORCES WILL BE SMALL AND NOT ABLE BY THEMSELVES TO HANDLE ALL THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY PROBLEMS FOR SOME TIME, BUT FOR JUST THIS REASON A START MUST BE MADE. POSSIBILITY SYRIAN SUBVERSION OF ARMY SEEMS REMOTE TO US. LEBANESE POLITICAL GROUPS, ALTHOUGH NOT ALTOGETHER ON BOARD AT PRESENT, WILL INCREASINGLY
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SUPPORT ARMY AS IT DEVELOPS. LEBANON HAS, AND WILL USE, RESOURCES OF ITS OWN TO DEVELOP AND EQUIP ARMY, BUT NEEDS HELP AT THIS JUNCTURE. END SUMMARY.

2. APPRECIATE SENATORS' CONCERN VOICED TO AHERTON ON JUNE 30 ABOUT PROPOSED FMS PROGRAM LEBANON. SOME OF THEIR QUESTIONS ARE DIFFICULT TO ANSWER IN

PRESENT CONTEXT AND OUR ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION FOR PROGRAMS IS GRIMNESS OF ALTERNATIVES. SENATOR JAVITS, FOR INSTANCE, IN HIS JUNE 27 REMARKS, ASKED WHETHER LEBANON WAS TO REMAIN UNDER SYRIAN HEGEMONY. CERTAINLY ITS CHANCES OF ESCAPING SUCH HEGEMONY WILL BE ZERO IF IT HAS NO EFFECTIVE ARMY. SIMILARLY, HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PLO BEING A STATE WITHIN A STATE HERE. WHILE WE WOULD NOT ARGUE THAT THREE BRIGADES CAN TAKE ON FATAH, ABSENCE OF LEBANESE ARMY TODAY IS A PRIMARY FACTOR IN CURRENT STALEMATE BETWEEN GOL AND PLO. LEBANON WILL NEVER KNOW STABILITY AND SOVEREIGNTY UNLESS ITS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAS AT ITS DISPOSAL MILITARY FORCES IT CAN USE TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL ORDER.

3. WHILE THEORETICALLY THERE ARE NUMBER OF POTENTIAL SOURCES OF HELP FOR LEBANON ARMY, WE ARE THE ONLY POWER TO DATE WHICH HAS SHOWN INTEREST IN CONCERTED EFFORT TO CREATE USEFUL MILITARY FORCE. LEBANON'S ARAB BROTHERS ARE VARIOUSLY UNSUITED TO THE TASK, OR UNWELCOME, OR DO NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES. SAUDI ARABIANS, WHO IN PROCESS MASSIVE DEVELOPMENT THEIR OWN ARMY, NOT IN POSITION TO TRAIN AND EQUIP LEBANESE ARMY. JORDANIANS HAVE COME FORWARD WITH CONCRETE IF MODEST OFFER OF SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT, AND TRAINING, ALTHOUGH THEIR SUPERIOR

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ATTITUDE TOWARDS LEBANESE MAY RENDER IT NUGATORY. SYRIANS ALLEGEDLY HAVE MADE OFFER TO FACILITATE SUPPLY OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT, BUT WE UNDERSTAND LEBANESE HAVE TURNED THIS DOWN. GIVEN DESTRUCTIVE ROLE BEING PLAYED BY IRAQIS AND LIBYANS HERE, WE CERTAINLY WOULD NOT WANT TO ENCOURAGE LEBANESE DEPENDENCE ON THEM. THE NORTH AFRICANS HAVE THEIR OWN FISH TO FRY AND KUWAITIS DO NOT HAVE THE MILITARY CAPACITY TO DO THE JOB. WHAT IS NEEDED IN ANY EVENT IS NOT AN UNCOORDINATED FLOW OF SURPLUS EQUIPMENT BUT A CAREFULLY PLANNED PROGRAM TO GIVE THE LEBANESE WHAT THEY NEED TO FIELD A FIGHTING FORCE. THIS IS NOT SOMETHING JUST ANYONE CAN DO. INDEED, WE HAVE AN ALMOST UNIQUE CAPABILITY IN THIS REGARD.

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4. THERE WILL BE SOME ACQUISITION OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING FROM EUROPEAN SOURCES. FRENCH, WHO ARE TRADITIONAL SUPPLIERS, WILL BE SUPPLYING CERTAIN EQUIPMENT AND WE ARE INFORMED THAT A FOUR-MAN TEAM HAS JUST BEEN SENT TO FRANCE TO DISCUSS ACQUISITION HEAVY WEAPONS. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER FRANCE WILL EXTEND CREDITS FOR THIS PURPOSE BUT WOULD HOPE THAT CONSIDERATIONS OF STABILITY IN AREA WILL OVERCOME THEIR CUSTOMARY FRUGALITY. BRITISH AND BELGIANS HAVE ALSO BEEN APPROACHED FOR MILITARY AID BUT SO FAR ARE ONLY INTERESTED IN MINIMAL SALES PROGRAM.

5. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH LEBANESE, AND IN PARTICULAR WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE FUAD BOUTROS AND CHIEF OF STAFF VICTOR KHOURY, THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING A LIMITED PROGRAM OF SALES. WE HAD NOT, UNTIL THE RECENT WASHINGTON LEAK, EVEN MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF A MULTI-YEAR PROGRAM. LEBANESE ARE NOT REQUESTING HEAVY
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EQUIPMENT FROM US, AND HAVE THE MESSAGE THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO SUPPLY THEM WITH ANYTHING SOPHISTICATED. I HAVE MENTIONED NO FIGURES BEYOND SAYING THAT WE HOPE WE MAY HAVE \$20 MILLION AVAILABLE IN FMS CREDITS THIS YEAR. \$100 MILLION FIGURE, WHICH HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC IN WASHINGTON LEAK, HAS COME

AS SOMETHING OF SURPRISE TO LEBANESE, WHO HAD NO IDEA WE WERE PREPARED BE THAT FORTHCOMING, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE POOR-MOUTHING I HAVE BEEN DOING HERE FOR PAST FEW MONTHS.

6. FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC CONCERNS MENTIONED PARA 8 OF REFTTEL:

A. FEAR THAT THIS WOULD BE AN OPEN-ENDED POLITICAL COMMITMENT, DRAWING US DOWN A SLIPPERY PATH INTO A VIETNAMESE SITUATION. AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO LEBANESE THE LIMITED NATURE OF WHAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DO AND I DO NOT THINK THEY HAVE ANY ILLUSIONS THAT OUR COMMITMENT TO THEM IS OPEN-ENDED. THEY NEVERTHELESS HAVE TAKEN COMFORT FROM OUR VARIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE SARKIS GOVERNMENT AND WILL REGARD THIS AID AS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF THAT SUPPORT. I SUSPECT THAT IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS WE MAY BE CALLED UPON TO GIVE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THAT SUPPORT, BUT AM JUST AS CERTAIN THAT THE LEBANESE REALIZE THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO INVOLVE OURSELVES IN ANOTHER VIET-NAM, THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO COMMIT TROOPS TO DEFEND LEBANON, AND THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS WE NOT PREPARED SAVE LEBANESE FROM THEMSELVES. LEBANESE WERE SORELY DISAPPOINTED BY OUR INACTION IN 1975 AND 1976 AND ARE QUITE SKEPTICAL ABOUT WHAT

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WE ARE LIKELY TO DO IN FUTURE. ILLUSIONS DO NOT GROW IN SUCH CLIMATE.

B. HIGH VISIBILITY OF SUCH A PROGRAM. WE ARE HIGHLY VISIBLE WHATEVER WE DO IN LEBANON, AND INDEED IT HAS BEEN ONE OF MY OPERATING PRINCIPLES TO MAINTAIN REASONABLE VISIBILITY AS A MEANS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO THE REGIME. THE FACT THAT WE ARE SUPPLYING MILITARY ASSISTANCE WILL BE KNOWN BY EVERYONE AND THERE WILL BE NO CONCEALING IT. I DO NOT THINK THIS IS A BAD THING. THE SYRIANS ARE NOW SUPPORTING THE REGIME WITH THE PRESENCE OF SOMETHING OVER 20,000 TROOPS. THEY ARE GOING TO BE CONSIDERABLY MORE CONSPICUOUS THAN WE. THE FRENCH ARE ALSO GOING TO BE INVOLVED IN A MILITARY SALES PROGRAM HERE, AND SO TO A LESSER DEGREE WILL THE JORDANIANS AND OTHER ARABS. WE WILL NOT BE ALONE IN THIS ENDEAVOR ALTHOUGH, AS NOTED ABOVE, WE WILL BE THE ONLY POWER WITH A CONCERTED PROGRAM.

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C. CONCERN THAT THE FORCE WILL BE TOO SMALL AND WEAK OR THAT IT WILL BE SUBVERTED, OR THAT LEBANESE FACTIONS WOULD NOT SUPPORT EITHER THE ARMY OR THE U.S. ROLE IN ASSISTING IT. CERTAINLY A FORCE OF THREE LIGHT-ARMORED BRIGADES WILL BE TOO SMALL AND WEAK TO CARRY ON MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS FOR ANY PROLONGED PERIOD AGAINST A WELL-ARMED AND NUMEROUS ENEMY. ON OTHER HAND, TOGETHER WITH THE BRIGADE NOW BEING FORMED IN THE BEKAA, THIS WOULD GIVE THE ARMY TOTAL STRENGTH OF FOUR COMBAT BRIGADES AS OPPOSED TO FIVE BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR. (SOME TWO-THIRDS OF LEBANESE ARMY PRE-WAR WAS IN STAFF AND SUPPORT UNITS.) DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL THAT ARMY WAS SO SMALL THAT TRADITIONALLY NATIONAL ELECTIONS HAVE HAD TO BE HELD A WEEK APART IN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF THE COUNTRY SO THAT THE ARMY CAN BE MOVED ABOUT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE DIFFERENT AREAS. LEBANON DOES NOT WANT AND CANNOT SUPPORT A LARGE ARMY. THE FORCE IN QUESTION, PROPERLY USED, WOULD BE LARGE ENOUGH TO COPE WITH THE NORMAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS COUNTRY, GIVEN ITS STATUS AS A NON-CONFRONTATION STATE. IT
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WOULD NOT BE LARGE ENOUGH TO PERMIT IT TO COPE WITH A

UNIFIED PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE UNLESS SUPPORTED
MILITARILY IN THAT TASK BY SYRIA. UNLESS OTHER ARAB
STATES COOPERATE, LEBANON'S PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IS BEYOND
LEBANON'S CAPABILITIES OF MANAGEMENT AT THE MOMENT. ITS
ABILITY TO COPE WITH THE PROBLEM, HOWEVER, WOULD BE INCREASED
A QUANTUM JUMP BY HAVING AN ARMY.
THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING SUBVERTED BY SYRIANS IS,
WE SUBMIT, LARGELY THEORETICAL. SYRIANS HAVE LARGE
INTELLIGENCE NETWORK HERE AND GOOD MANY HIRED FOLLOWERS.
THEY DO NOT ENJOY ANY GENUINE POLITICAL SUPPORT EXCEPT
FROM MINORITY PARTIES, SUCH AS THAT REPRESENTING THE
SYRIAN BAATH. THAT PARTY HAS SOME THEORETICAL CAPABILITY,
GIVEN ITS SUPPORT BY THE SYRIAN ARMY, BUT ITS LIMITS ARE
WELL ILLUSTRATED BY THE FAILURE TO DATE OF THE EFFORTS
TO LAUNCH THE SO-CALLED BROAD NATIONAL FRONT (SEE
BEIRUT 3085). NO ONE EITHER ON THE RIGHT OR THE LEFT
IN THIS COUNTRY, EXCEPT A VERY MARGINAL LEFTIST
GROUPING, WANT THE SYRIANS TO STAY HERE INDEFINITELY.
EVEN WERE THE SYRIANS TO SEEK TO SUBVERT THE LEBANESE ARMY, A
POINT WHICH WE LEAVE DAMASCUS TO COMMENT ON, WE DO NOT
THINK THEY HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF DOING IT. THEY MIGHT
IMPOSE HEGEMONY, BUT THAT IS SOMETHING ELSE.
THE ATTITUDE OF LEBANESE FACTIONS IS SOMETHING THAT
IS HARD TO BE CATEGORICAL ABOUT WITHOUT DISCUSSING IT
WITH LEADERS OF THE FACTIONS. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER,
EVERYONE IN LEBANON, EXCEPT THE EXTREME LEFT, HAS BEEN
IN FAVOR OF RESTORING THE ARMY TO AN EFFECTIVE ROLE.
THIS INCLUDES CHAMOUN AND HIS SON DANY, WHO IN
CONVERSATIONS WITH ME HAVE AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE
OF OUR GIVING EFFECTIVE AID TO THE ARMY (ALTHOUGH
THEIR MOTIVES ARE SUSPECT); PIERRE GEMAYEL, WHO HAS
BEMOANED TO ME THE LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE ARMY; SAEB
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SALAM AND RASHID KARAME, WHO HAVE MADE SIMILAR COMMENTS;
WALID JUMBLATT; AND A WIDE VARIETY OF HIGH OFFICIALS
AND PRIVATE CITIZENS WITH WHOM WE HAVE HAD CONTACT OVER
THE PAST SIX MONTHS AND WHO HAVE CONSIDERED THE LACK OF
AN ARMY ONE OF THEIR PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR CONCERN ABOUT
THE FUTURE STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY. THE EXCEPTIONS TO
THIS ARE THE LEFTIST PARTIES AND THE PALESTINIAN
REJECTIONISTS WHO HAVE PROFITED FROM THE ANARCHY AND
CHAOS TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN LEBANON. ALTHOUGH WE
HAVE NO DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE PLO AND FATAH, WE HAVE
THE IMPRESSION THOSE ORGANIZATIONS MIGHT WELCOME THE
EXISTENCE OF A STRONG UNIFIED LEBANESE ARMY AS GIVING
SOME COUNTERBALANCE TO THE SYRIANS AND THE CHRISTIAN
MILITIAS, AND AS GIVING THEM SOMEONE RESPONSIBLE TO
TALK TO. THE ATTITUDE OF THE MILITIAS IS SOMEWHAT
AMBIGUOUS. BASHIR GEMAYEL, MILITARY COMMANDER OF THE

PHALANGE MILITIA, APPEARS TO WANT TWO ARMIES -- ONE CHRISTIAN, ONE MOSLEM. HIS CHAMOUNIST OPPOSITE NUMBER, DANY CHAMOUN, MAY HARBOR SIMILAR IDEAS, AND THE QUESTION OF INTEGRATING CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS IS THE BIGGEST SINGLE ISSUE FACING THE ARMY TODAY. AS WE HAVE INDICATED EARLIER, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE THAT GENERAL KHOURY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL IN OVERCOMING THIS OBSTACLE. WE THINK WE CAN GUARANTEE HIS FAILURE, HOWEVER, BY NOT HELPING HIM, WHILE WITH HELP HE HAS A CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. WE THINK, FURTHERMORE, THAT ONCE IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT AN EFFECTIVE ARMY IS BEING BUILT, DOUBTERS ON THE RIGHT WILL COME AROUND TO SUPPORT IT. WHILE THERE WILL BE THE INEVITABLE CARPING CRITICS, WE DO NOT FEEL THERE WILL BE SERIOUS LEBANESE CRITICISM OF US FOR HELPING IN THE BUILDING OF THE ARMY EXCEPT FROM THE EXTREMIST LEFT AND, SINCE WE CANNOT WIN WITH THOSE PEOPLE NO MATTER WHAT WE DO, THERE SEEMS LITTLE POINT IN WORRYING ABOUT THEIR REACTION.

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D. LEBANON HAS RESOURCES OF ITS OWN TO PURCHASE COMMERCIALLY WHAT IT NEEDS. IT IS TRUE THAT LEBANON HAS SUBSTANTIAL CURRENCY RESERVES, BUT ONCE IT STARTS SPENDING THOSE RESERVES, THE VALUE OF ITS CURRENCY, WHICH IS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS NOW HOLDING THE ECONOMY TOGETHER, IS GOING TO SUFFER. THIS HAS BEEN MADE VERY CLEAR IN BANKING CIRCLES. THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK, FOR INSTANCE, REPORTS THAT HE GETS

DAILY CALLS ON THE SUBJECT FROM SPECULATORS WHO ARE WAITING FOR THIS ACTION AS A SIGN THAT THE BOTTOM IS GOING TO FALL OUT. THE IBRD HAS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED AGAINST THE LEBANESE TOUCHING THEIR RESERVES, AGREEING WITH THE LEBANESE THAT THIS IS A PRIME FACTOR FOR STABILITY. WE ARE NOT, AFTER ALL, PLANNING TO GIVE THE WEAPONS TO LEBANON, WE ARE GOING TO SELL THEM AT TERMS WHICH ARE NOT EVEN PARTICULARLY CONCESSIONAL. I DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS PREMATURE FOR US TO DO SO.

7. ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE ABOVE ANSWERS MOST OF QUESTIONS IN PARA 10 REFTTEL, PERHAPS RECAPITULATION WOULD BE USEFUL:
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A. WITH EXCEPTION OF LEFTISTS AND REJECTIONISTS, WE BELIEVE MOST LEBANESE FACTIONS WILL SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE IF NOT IN DEED CREATION OF NATIONAL ARMY AND U.S. ASSISTANCE WITH THAT TASK. WE SAY "IN PRINCIPLE" BECAUSE BOTH CHAMOUNISTS AND PHALANGISTS WOULD REALLY LIKE TO HAVE SEPARATE, CANTONAL ARMIES, UNDER THEIR CONTROL, AT LEAST AT THIS STAGE, AND THEIR PUBLIC ATTITUDES HAVE NOT BEEN VERY HELPFUL TO DATE. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT CONCEPT OF UNIFIED ARMY IF THEY SAW IT BEGINNING TO WORK. WE WOULD NOT EXPECT THEM TO OPPOSE IT IN ANY EVENT, AS LONG AS THEY CONFIDENT IT NOT BECOMING MOSLEM-DOMINATED.

B. WE HAVE BEEN COMBING PAPERS FOR QUOTABLE QUOTES AND FIND FEW OF REAL RELEVANCE. CHAMOUNISTS AND GEMAYELS KEEP TALKING PUBLICLY ABOUT NEED TO PROTECT THOSE OFFICERS WHO "FOUGHT FOR LEGALITY," MEANING THOSE WHO FOUGHT FOR MARONITES. ONCE THEY ARE ASSURED THAT MARONITES WILL NOT BE SACRIFICED, THEY WILL ACCEPT NATIONAL ARMY. CHAMOUN, FOR INSTANCE, ON JULY 7, SPOKE APPROVINGLY TO ME OF PROGRESS MADE TO DATE IN INTEGRATING UPPER LEVELS OF ARMY, INDICATING THAT PROCESS OF RECONCILING HIMSELF TO PROSPECT HAS ALREADY BEGUN. SIMILARLY, HIS SON DANY IN CONVERSATIONS WITH DATT HAS SPOKEN OF NEED FOR UNIFIED ARMY. HE DOES NOT HAVE MUCH CONFIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT ONE WILL BE CREATED SOON ENOUGH TO HAVE MEANINGFUL IMPACT ON THE CURRENT PROBLEM.

C. AS OPPOSED TO DOUBTS ABOUT CERTAIN MARONITE POSITIONS, WE THINK THERE NO DOUBT AS TO VIEWS OF
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SUNNIS AND SHIA'A, BOTH OF THOSE SECTS BEING VERY ANXIOUS FOR FORMATION OF NATIONAL ARMY BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO MILITIAS TO DEFEND THEM. IMAM MUSA SADR, FOR INSTANCE, MADE STATEMENT ON FEBRUARY 22 CALLING UNIFIED ARMY BACKBONE OF LEBANON.

D. AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE HAVE IMPRESSION PLO/ FATAH WOULD NOT OBJECT TO HAVING EFFECTIVE LEBANESE ARMY. LOCAL CONTACT WHO IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH THINKING AND ATTITUDES OF HIGH LEVEL PALESTINIANS MAINTAINS RIGHTIST PALESTINIANS WOULD WELCOME U.S. ASSISTANCE TO LEBANESE ARMY AS MOVE TOWARDS BUILDING A STRONGER CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

E. WE EXPECT LOCAL LEFTIST PARTIES (INCLUDING PERHAPS NON-DRUZE JUMBLATTIS, IN SPITE OF WALID'S VIEWS) AND IRAQI-LIBYAN SUPPORTED REJECTIONISTS TO OPPOSE IDEA. WE BELIEVE THAT IS ONE OF THE RISKS WE WILL HAVE TO RUN.

8. WITH REGARD QUESTION IN PARA 11 REFTTEL, WE THINK LEBANESE WILL EVENTUALLY BE IN POSITION TO UNDERTAKE REGULAR FMS PURCHASES FOR CASH AS OPPOSED TO CREDIT. AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, THEY NEED HELP AND, AS NOTED ABOVE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE ASKED TO DIP INTO RESERVES FOR THIS PURPOSE AT THIS JUNCTURE. FURTHERMORE, AS REFTTEL NOTES, FACT WE PREPARED TO HELP THEM IS IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICALLY AS WELL AS MATERIALLY. AM SURE SARKIS WILL BE PREPARED REACH AGREEMENT WITH US IN ADVANCE ON LIMITS OF PROGRAM, INCLUDING FIRM THREE-YEAR TERMINATION DATE. I HAVE ASSUMED ALL ALONG, IN FACT, THAT THIS WOULD BE MADE EXPLICIT IN WRITING BEFORE PROGRAM UNDERTAKEN.
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